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·FORMS OF ANGLO-SAXON CONTRACTS AND 
THEIR SANCTIONS.A 
T HE several forms of contract will be taken up in the follow-ing order: I. the Surety Contract, including (a) the credit-
or's r1ghts against the debtor, (b) the creditor's rights to 
sue the surety, and (c) the surety's right of reimbursement; 2. the 
lYarranty Contracts, including (a) warranty of title, and (b) war-
ranty of quality; 3. the Contract of Court Record; 4. the C 011,tract 
<d flighted Faith; 5. the _Pledge Contract; 6. the· "Delivery-Prom-· 
ise"; 7. the ivritten Contract; and 8. the "Earnest" Contract. 
By· way of introduction. two other topics will be briefly sum-
marized: I. Contract Transactions and Contract Actions,; and 2. 
the Procedural Contract, .including (a) the appearance contract, 
~nd (b) the judgment c·ontract. · 
The eight forms of the non-procedural contract will be placed in 
two periods. The first, A., begins with the laws of King AETHEL-
BERT, which date from 6or to 6o4. It includes also the laws of 
Kings HLOTHAER and EADRIC, WITHRAED, and !NE and runs to 
about 696. After that there is a gap of about 200 years during 
which we have no recorded laws. The second period, B., begins 
with the laws of King ALFRJ_;;D starting about 8go,1 and ends with 
the laws of King CNUT about r027_. 
The fir.st three, (r-3), of the above contracts will Le taken up in 
the first period, for. they seem to have had their origin at that time. 
The last five, (4-8), are placed in the second period. The eighth, 
the "earnest" contract was not fully developed even in the age of 
GLANVIL, but it is so clearly of Anglo-Saxon origin and so closely 
a. sociated V''ith the other i\nglo-Saxcn 'contracts that it seemed •best 
to take note of it. ·The contracts placed in the first subdivision will 
be treated as a whole under A., i. e. their history will be carried 
through the second period. The significance of the classification is. 
simply to indicate about· when the several contracts originated and 
to emphasize the conditions which gave rise to them. 
I. CONTRACT TRANSACTIONS AND CONTRACT ACTIONS. 
Before taking up the several forms of contract separately, it 
seems desirable to note the nature of the transactions to which the 
formalities were applied, and the nature of the actions (if Anglo-
•Copyright, r9r7. by Robert L. Henry, Jr. 
• Re came to the throne· in 871. 
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Saxon legal proceedings may be so called) by which contracts 
came to be protected. 
The principal, if not the only, contract transactions were of three 
types : (I) the executed barter, or sale, involving ccmtracts of 
warranty; ( 2) the barter or sale executed on one side only, and 
the loan; and ( 3) the bilateral bargain and sale, executory on 
both sides. 
So far as appears the contractual needs of our ~nglq-Saxon an-
cestors were confined to sales and loans. To· he sure there were 
surety and pledge contracts, but they were not collateral transac-
tions as with us, but were themselves the principal contracts. They 
were used for sales and loans, and will be treated not as distinct 
transactions, but as forms of contract. 
Leaving out of consideration the ·bilateral bargain-which ap-
peared as the "earnest" contract and which, as already noted, was 
still a fledgling at the end of the Anglo-Saxon period-all of the 
contracts-those of warranty, sale and loan-were unilateral. If 
each party in an exchange or a pledge entered into a covenant, the 
obligations were independent.2 
If the right~ involved may be judged from the actions available 
for their enforcement, they were all of a similar nature. In other 
words the remedy of a warrantee, of an unpaid" vendor, of a pur-
chaser who had paid but had not received the goods, and of a 
lender, was the same. 
It would be going. too far afield to enter into a discussion as to 
whether a vendee before delivery got "title and a "real" right, or 
whether a lender transferred the title in making a loan for use, or 
a deposit. It will be sufficient for our purposes to show that so 
far as the remedy 'Yas concerned, there was no difference between 
the rights of the obligee in the several kinds of transactions. For 
instance, we may call the vendee's right "real," if we please, but it 
was not available against a third party. If the buyer A had paid 
B for the chattel, and B then sold and transferred it tci C, A had no 
action against C, his action was against B on the contract.3 C got 
an indefeasible. title. Again the only action available to a vendee 
was purely personal. It was based upon coritract.4 
·Nor was there any di·fference in the remedy of a lender \vho had· 
loaned for use and one who had loaned for consumption. LAUGHLIN 
says,5 "In the action for the return of a fixed object, which had· 
.2 See the serond instalment of this paper. 
•Laughlin, The Anglo·Saxon Legal Procedure, Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, 204. 
• Laughlin, i96. Hereafter the essay by Laughlin cited in note al:iove will be cited 
-as "Laughlin." · 
• Laughlin, 199. 
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been loaned or deposited, HAVEL'S distinction between an obliga-
tory and a real right is untenable. The plaintiff in his claim as-
serted neither ownership nor a real right in opening the procedure, 
nor named the obligation arising from the contract. It was imma-
terial whether the object passed out of his possession as a com-
modatum, depositum, pledge, for inspection with purpose of sale, 
or for repair. As in the case of debt, a simple claim, without any 
statement of the legal obligation, set the procedure in motion." 
In brief, for all the contract transactions there was but one form 
of procedure, and one kind of claim. In each case the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant was under an obligation to give him a 
thing, or a definite sum of money, in none of them did the plaintiff 
claim that the thing or money was his. In each case the obligation 
which the plaintiff sought to establish by court proceedings was 
promissory. That is plainly indicated by the formulas used. 
The plaintiff opened the proceedings by the following oath : 
Oaths X. "In the name of the living God as I money demand, so 
have I lack of that which N. promised me when I mine to him sold." 
· The defendant's reply ran: Oaths XI. "In the name of the living 
God, I owe not to N "'sceatt" or shifling"; o·r penny's worth; but I have 
discharged to him all that I owed him, so far as our verbal contracts 
were at first." 6 
II. THE PROCEDURAL CONTRACT. 
The law began with the procedural contract, the treaty between 
two families, by which the defendant ~amily agreed to pay a com-
position in consideration of the plaintiff family giving up the pur· 
suit-of vengeance. 
An excellent picture of the negotiations leading up to such a . 
contract is to be found in the laws of King EDMUND. A is charged 
with having killed B. The family of B gathers and pursues A to 
wreak vengeance upon him. A appeals to one of the leading men 
of his own family, asks protection and promises to do the right 
thing; that is to stand trial if necessary and to pay a composition 
out of his own property in so far as he is able, if he is found guilty. 
The family of A gather for his protection. The two families under 
arms are· arrayed against each other. The dooms of EDMUND then 
proceed to describe what should take place. 
"First according to folk-right the slayer shall give hand-pledge 
to his for-speaker and the for-speaker to the kinsmen that the 
slayer will make bot to the kin. Then after that it is requisite that 
hand-pledge be given to the slayer's for-speaker that the slayer may 
•For a description of the procedure see Laughlin, 189-202. 
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come near and himself give wed for the wer. When he has done 
that let him find sureties."7 
It is the wed ceremony which concludes the treaty. That was as 
follows. The accused handed a stick, or in all probability his spear 
in the case described, to the spokesman of the accusing family, and 
the latter then handed it to the sureties who were representative 
men of the defendant family.8 
The meaning of the ceremony is this. A captured man is of 
course disarmed. In the case described the capture has been frus-
trated ·by the fleeing man's family. His weapon is handed to the 
pursue-rs and by them handed back to the family of the pursued in 
return for their solemn promise to see that the accused stand trial, 
if necessary, and that the composition, which will be due if he is 
found guilty, shall be paid.9 
The case pictured is one of a homicide, but every suit for a com-
position was of essentially the same nature. Feuds were pursued 
for killings for centuries after it had become customary to com-
pound for lesser injuries. They died hard, and it is d~te to that fact 
that at such a comparatively late date as the reign o! King EDMUND, 
(940-946) we get a picture of negotiations which were likely to take 
place and which the· king and his witan hoped would always take 
place after a slaying. If the injury was less serious the chances 
were that the family of the sufferer would not take up arms. But 
the pressure was of precisely the same kind. The person who had 
done the harm was compelled, through fear of the injured person's 
family, to give sureties from the members of his own family. Be-
cause of the identity in nature of all composition suits it is legiti-
mate to use a citation which comes from the second period in. pic-
turing the initiation of the contract employed in the first period as 
well as later. The customary law indeed said that when one man 
demanded justice of another the latter was bound to give him sure-
ties. And for failure to comply with such demand a fine was pre-
scribed.10 But there is every reason to believe from the general 
condition of the country, particularly its unorganized state, that 
during th~ early Anglo-Saxon period, at least, the threatened fine 
had little substantial effectiveness. The real force inducing the pro-
cedural contract was the potential strength of the plaintiff group. 
But suits were not long confined to composition claims ·for assault. 
battery and homicide. At an early date stealing, particularly cattle-
1 Edmund I., 'l· 
• \Vigmore, io Harv. L. Rev., 328n. 
1 Cf. Alfred 42, Edward 9. 
10 Hlothaer & Eadric, 8. 
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stealing, gave trouble. The procedure in .such cases was set in 
motion by a faying hold of the chattel claimed. The possessor then 
had either to give it up or give sureties, who would see to it that he 
was brought to trial to defend his title.11 
When· contracts became actionable, the procedural contract was 
obtained in advance, that is, at the time the contract was made. 
Sureties were then given by the debtor whose business it was to see 
that performance took place, or in case a dispute arose, to bring the 
debtor to court and to see that he performed the judgment rendered. 
The contract procedure was based on the procedural contract.12 In 
short, ali civil actions were founded on contract.13 
When the procedural contract, with which every law suit began,14 
was once entered into, what was the sanction insuring its perform-
ance? As far as the promisee-family was concerned it was primarily 
the good faith and honor of the promisor-family, with whatever re-
ligious and customary sanctions the ceremony carried with it. 
In addition in the composition and theft cases there was some in-
ducement to the state to take a further interest in the matter, in 
the shape of the witte, or peace-money. As the offenses for which 
<:ompositions were demanded were also breaches of the folk-peace, 
defendants had to pay not only bot or satisfaction money ~o the 
plaintiffs, but also the witte to the representative of the state, the 
king.15 Theft, also having a criminal aspect, was a matter in which 
the state was concerned throughout the proceedings. But in con-
tract cases there was no such public interest, and as to them the 
sureties were the sole sanction. 
The procedural contract normally included both (a) a contract 
to produce the defendant in court to answer to the claim and (b) 
a contract to pay the judgment rendered.16 They could, however, 
be separate. For instance, bail of a person charged with crime could 
discharge their lia!bility by producing and surrendering the accused.17 
On the other hand, it might happen that a man could not find sure-
ties before t.rial. In that case he might be imprisoned up to the time 
of trial. Then if condemned, an opportunity was given to relatives 
or friends to redeem him by becoming surety for the amount of the 
11 Laughlin, 202 et. seq. 
" Laughlin, 196. 
:u Laughlin, 189, citing Sohm, Das Recht der Eheschliessung, 24-26, 78-87, "adding 
the weight of his authority to Laband" to the effect that German civil actions were 
founded on contracts. 
" Hlotbaer & Eadric, 8; Ine, 8. 
u Laughlin, 273. 
u "De judicio siste" and "de judicio solvi," Laughlin, 190. 
11 Edgar; II., 6. 
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judgment.18 In the last case, or in any case in which immediate 
satisfacti.:m of the judgment was not made, we see a judgment con-
tract. It was always a contract with sureties. 
What was the sanction behind it? The sureties and the solemnity 
of their undertaking. The state was no longer concerned. There 
was not even the threat of a fine, or the prospect. of a share in the 
proceeds, as was the case before judgment. . 
What of execution? As far as appears there was no such thing 
as a suit upon a judgment. There was no assistance by the state in 
the matter of executing a judgment. It had to be done by the plain-
tiff, in so far as it was done.19 It was the business of courts to 
declare rights, not to enforce them. As a practical question, how-
ever, the situation was not bad. For if the sureties were of the 
proper sort, the judgilient would' be executed. Also public opinion 
and social pressure were so strong that to declare a right, to the 
knowledge of the whole community, must generally have been as 
effective as enforcing its execution. 
In the second period, which begins with the reign of King ALFRED, 
two important developments took place which materially affected 
the legal situation. In the first place society became organized pn 
a new basis. The country was divided into hundreds and tithings. 
The first mention of such organization is to ·be fou~d in the laws of 
King EDGAR, 959-975.20 By the laws of King ETHELRED, 978-1016, 
it was provided that every freeman should have a true borh, i. e., a 
surety, "that the borh may present him to every justice, if he should 
be accused."21 In the country every ten men were bound together 
in tithings. They were required to be sureties for each other. In 
the cities and towns men were bound by town or gild organizations.22 
Every lord had to be a protector and surety of his dependents.23 
There were then few unattached or lordless men, and if any of such 
got into trouble it was apt to go hard with_ them. . 
In the second place, from the reign of King A:ETH:ELSTAN, 925-
940, the state--represented by the king, his sheriffs, and the eal-
dormen-began to take a more substantial part in inducing the sub-
mission of cases to adjudication. From that time on,24 the law is 
full of references of "riding" to compel recalcitrant families to enter 
into the procedural treaty. In addition to that, penalties of the 
:11 Edward, 9; Aethelstan, V. Twelfth-; Aethelstan, V. 4. 
11 Laughlin, 193, 196. 
:t Edgar, I, Intro. 2. 
:n Ethelred, I, 1 ; Cnut, 20. 
22 Alfred, ~7· 
"'Aethelstan, I, 2, IV, r; Ethelred, I, r. 
u Aethelstan, V, eighth 2, 3. 
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severest kind, outlawry, and confiscation of goods were prescribed 
for contumacy, for being tiht-bisig or untrue to the people. Being 
'thrice absent from the gamot, which in itself was a breach of duty 
to the state and at the same time prevented the initiation of suits 
and prosecutions and summons or arrest, was such an offense.25 
All of this meant that the executive machinery, such as it was, 
was now to be seriously employed to enforce the customary law. 
The sanction, of course, was not as complete as it became a few 
centuries later, when the state took over both the summons and the 
execution of judgments, which throughout the whole of the Anglo-
Saxon period remained with the parties. The changes nevertheless 
were significant. 
The matter was one of emphasis. The procedural contract was 
still a contract, in the second period as well as in the first. The 
difference was merely that it was generally provided in advance, 
that is, before the wrong was committed; and that the state had 
determine~ to use more effective duress to induce the making of 
the contract. 
A.-6or A. D. TO 696 A. D. 
I. THE SURETY CONTRACT. 
(a) The creditor's rights against the debtor. 
Precisely the same wed ceremony was used for extra-judicial con-
tracts as for the procedural.26 The contract thus employed may be 
called the surety contract. 27 Its chief characteristic was that the 
surety was bound, the deotor was not.28 Even as late as GLANVIL 
such was the case. 29 In order to sue on a surety contract the surety 
had to be summoned, not the debtor.30 
Ho,y then can we 'talk about the creditor's rights against the 
debtor? It is believed legitimate to do so even though they had to 
be worked out through the surety and with his assistance. For 
when a surety was summoned to '·acquit" the creditor, he produced 
the debtor to make defense, and the issue was between creditor 
and debtor. 
The party primarily concerned was the debtor-. It was his busi-
ness to perform. It ·Was his business to save the surety harmless. 
It was his business to defend, to take the clearing oath, if he could. 
"Edgar, II, 7. 
2f Hlothaer & Eadric, 6, Ine, 13. 
21 Holmes, The Common Law, p. 247 • 
.. Wigmore, IO Harv. L. Rev., 328n. 
29 Glanvil, Book X, c. 3. 
" Cf. Glanvil, Book X, c. 4 
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If judgment went for the creditor, it was the debtor's property 
which was applied to its payment, so far as it would go. And in 
contract matters, unlike the case where a very large wer had to be 
paid for a killing, the debtor was most likely to have sufficient prop-
erty of his own with which to pay. If the surety paid in the first 
instanc_e, he could constrain the debtor to reimburse him: So al-
though the surety only was treaty-bound to the creditor, and the 
debtor in tum bound to the surety by being under his protection and 
power, the rights of the creditor against the debtor were real, even 
though indirect. 
It·may be asked what reason have we to suppose that contracts 
were actionable at all, or that there was any such thing as a binding 
contract as early as our first period of Anglo-Saxon law? Con-
tracts that are non-procedural are referred to in the "laws" very 
early.31 The mere fact that they are, is some argument for their 
existence, but perhaps not conclusive, for may not matters be spoken 
of in our Anglo-Saxon "laws" which were not legally sanctioned? 
It is quite possible. If we apply an Austinian definition of law we 
may be embarassed td find any law in primitive times. And yet if 
we are less exacting· than that as to wnat is law, may we not find ·a 
substantial difference between a man's right to a composit~on and 
his rights on a non-procedm::al contract? It may be suggested that 
the right to a composition itself-as every right of action in primitive 
Anglo-Saxon Law-was contractual, based on the procedural con-
tract. But waiving that point of view, what eviden~e is there that 
the early law recognized and sanctioned non-pi:ocedural or commer-
cial contracts ? . 
The early law, it will be said, did not concern itself ·with con-
tracts. Primitive law begins with a tariff of .compositions, for as-
sault, battery, and homicide.32 Theri larceny and property-,,recovery 
come into notice. Those subjects, with procedural regulations, form 
almost the entire content of the early "laws." Contracts are only 
referred to in the mo.st incidental manner. The end of state-sanc-
tioned law was the pr~servation of the peace. Breaches of contract 
were not deemed sufficiently menacing to the peace to engage at-
tention. 
But even assuming, for the time being, that there was no redress 
by action for breach of contract, it would ·be a mistake to suppose 
that contracts did not exist and were not employed. The only sub-
stantial sanction even in claims for compositions was family pres-
sure and cust-0m. In the composition cases, in order to insure the 
at Hloth. & Ead. 6, Ine 13. 
•• Laws of Aethelbert (601 A. D.--604 A. D.) 
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giving of sureties, the state threatened a fine for refusal. But in 
the case of surety contracts there was no need of a threatened fine, 
for sureties had been provided when the contract was made. From 
a purely practical-point of view, if the state sanctions were of little 
effect, as seems to have been the case, the surety contract was better 
s~ctioned than the right to a composition, regardless of wl}ether 
there was any state sanction behind it or not. _ 
It may, however, have been the case that suit could be brought 
upon a surety contract without there being any state pressure to 
compel submission to the court. There were the sureties who could 
compel the debtor to appear. 
But regardless of a right to sue for breach, if we look at realities 
rather than definitions we must conclude that the surety contract 
was as real a right as one to a composition. 
But was the surety contract an actionable contract .in the early· 
law? Probably. Germanic civil actions were founded on con-
tracts.33 LAUGHLIN says in speaking of debt, "It is to be seen then, 
in conclusion, that this procedure was founded on a unilateral obli-
gation arising from a contract in genere."3 -l To sue on a composi-
tion one must demand sureties to do jus~ice; to sue for property one 
must demand its return and the defendant must comply or give 
sureties to prove that the thing is his own; to sue on a contract it 
is only necessary to apply to the sureties already given. If there is 
a defense, lhe sureties will produce the debtor in court to make such 
defense. By its origin and very .nature the surety contract is a pro-
cedural contract, and whenever you have such a contract you have 
a potential law-suit. 
It will not be asserted positively, in the abseQce of clearer evi-
dence, that the surety contract was actionable in the first period of 
Anglo7Saxon law. Assuming for purposes of argument that it was 
not actionable that early, when did it become so? In the age of 
GLANVIL we find a special writ of Debt to summon sureties on 
surety contracts.35 At an earlier date, our second period, a.general 
debt procedure had been developed.36 It had then become possi·ble 
to sue debtors on unsecured debts; that is, where there were neither 
sureties nor pledges. It may have happened that at that time the 
right to sue on surety contracts also arose. 
On the other hand it may conceivably have been later. Our an-
cestors may have reasoned this way. A creditor has his choice. He 
may rely on sureties, or he may take a pledge, or he may trust in a 
" Laughlin, l 90. 
"' Laughlin, 196. 
35 Clanvil, Boox X,. c. 4. 
" Laughlin, 189 et seq. 
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remedy given him by the law and allow another to become indebted 
to him without security. If he relies on sureties or pledges, and 
they fail him, he has only himself to blame and should not ask for 
legal redress. ··The fact that a pledgee had no right to sue the pledgor 
on~ the debt in any "case31 argues for such a theory. Such was the 
rule even in the age of GLANVIL.38 But there was a special reason 
why 'the pledgee could not sue ;39 the fact that the creditor did have 
a right to sue the surety on a surety contract at that time40 argues 
the other way, that is in favor of the prior actionability of the 
surety contract. 
If we take into consideration that the surety contract was the 
basic contract; that it was ,not only itself used for every kind of 
transaction,n bht was the parent of all other forms of contract, it 
does not seem at all likely that Debt could be brought on some con-
tracts and not on the surety contract. That surety- contracts d~d 
not become actionable until a general debt procedure had been 
developed seems improbable. The development was more likely the 
other way, from an actionable surety contract, to an action on a 
contract in which there was no surety. 
Does the wording of the oaths in the debt procedure indicate that 
the promises sued on were made •by debtors and not by sureties? 
The plaintiff's oath ran: "In the name of the living God, as I 
money demand; so have I lack of that which N. promised me when 
I mine to him sold."42 
The issue appears to be between a creditor and a debtor. But 
that is what is to be eXpected, even in a suretY, contrac!. An oath 
asserting a promise •by the debtor might be looked for in view of 
a development which had taken place, namely the custom of requir-
ing the debtor, as well as the surety, to take a promissory oath at 
the time the contract was made. When such a stage had been 
reached it might be proper to say that both sureties and debtor were 
treaty-bound. Though the intrinsic relationships· between creditor, 
sureties and debtor remained the same, Y.OU could not sue a debtor 
if there was a surety.43 You sued the surety, but the debtor de-
fended and the pleadings ran against him. 
But what of the scope of actionable promises? Suppose it is 
shown, as seems to be clear, t,hat only such promises were actionable 
"Wigmore, IO Harv. L. Rev., 327 • 
.. Glanvil, Boole X. c. 8. 
31 Sec the second instalment of this paper. 
" Glat1Vil, Book X, c. 3. 
ct Laughlin, Igo. 
<J Q,.q}is, IO • 
., Cf. Glanvil. Book V, c. 3. 
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as assumed obligations to pay money or deliver property. Were 
there not other promises undertaken by debtors and sureties in 
surety contrac~s? For instance a relative of a minor might be put 
under sureties to safely keep the minor's property until he became 
of age." Again a bridegroom bound himself to the relatives of the 
bride "to keep her according to God's law as a ma~ should his wife," 
and sureties were given to hold him to such promise. ' 5 As to the 
first. sort of obligation there is no difficulty. The curator of the 
minor's property was bound to deliver at the time specified, just as 
in a sale or a loan there was an obligation to deliver. 
As to the betrothal, which in origin and form was a contract, it 
seems reasonably certain that if a 1!.usband did not treat his wife as 
a Christian husband should, the only penalty-other than surety 
pressure-was church-inflicted. The obligation was not a lay debt. 
Other examples-besides the betrothal-of surety contracts which 
could not be resolved into promises to pay money or deliver goods 
seem to be lacking. There are quite a number of undertakings by 
the wed ceremony which appear in the laws and which do not fall 
within the above category. They seem to ·be contracts without sure-
ties:'8 · There is nothing, however, in the nature of the surety con-
tract to confine it within such narrow limits. But if it was used for 
other types of promises, procedure was lacking for legal redress 
upon breach. There was no machinery for assessing unliquidated 
damages. If used for such promises, it wi11 have to be admitted that 
no suit could be brought .. The whole sanction-must have been the 
.constraint and social pressure involved in the ceremony and the rela-
tionships thereby created. 
There would, however, .seem to be no force in an argument that 
the surety contract was not actionable, because it was capable of 
_being used for promises which by their nature could not be re-
dressed by t~e existing· legal machinery. 
It is· submitted then that the :development was as follows. The 
surety contract, as a procedural contract, was actionable· from the 
very beginning of Anglo-Saxon law. The cinly usual issue whic~ 
such a contract would raise would be on th"e question of perform-
ance. The making of the contract was a public. fact which could 
not easily be disputed. Note that the quoted formula raises only 
the issue of performance. At some time, probably quite early, such 
issues were litigated. After a time, because it was perceived that 
the controversy was primarily ;between creditor and debtor, and be-
ff H!otbaer & E;adric, 6. 
a Edmund "Of Betrothing," I·9· 
"See the second instalment of this paper. 
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-cause in addition it had become customary to get the debtor to 
promise as well as the surety, the oath which was the plaintiff's dec-
laration came to run in the above-quoted words. 
There is nb reason to believe that in our first period the state 
exercised any pressure to get debtors in contract controversies to 
<:ourl. If the surety contract was employed there was ·no need for 
any such :5'ressure. The sureties were relied on for that. 
In the later period, as will be shown, the state took more of an 
interest in contracts, •but the indications are that even then, if there. 
were sureties, the law worked through them and not directly \Vith 
the debtor. As before, issues between creditor and debtor were 
raised as a part of the process by which the sureties '"acquitted" 
themselves. 
(b) The Creditor's Right to Sue the Surety. 
But all this assumes the ht>nor and good faith of the surety, or 
that social pressure will be sufficient to induce him to carry out his 
obligations. Such usually would be the case; But suppose the 
surety is recalcitrant, that he either denies the obligation or simply 
refuses to do his duty, or to pay: What then? There can be no 
question that the law said that the surety should pay if the debtor 
defaulted.47 But how enforce such a right? 'vVas there any pro-
vision for that? If there was the prospect of a witte we may sur-
mise that there was a chance of state pressure. But if the matter 
was merely a breach of contract, it was not a breach of the peace, 
and hence would not interest the king. Possibly then the following 
words of King AETHELSTAN were applicable. "Now that is, because 
that the oaths, and the weds and the borhs are all disregarded and 
broken which there were given; and we know of no other things to 
trust in except it be this."48 In other words the only reliance was 
the wed ceremony and the sureties. If the sureties proved untrust-
worthy then there was nothing in which trust could be put. 
But there wa·s a general provision prescribing a fine for failure 
to give sureties when justice was demanqed. Why not put a recalci-
trant surety under sureties to answer for his suretyship? If the 
surety has failed to produce a debtor, we may take it that he has 
lost his chance to defend on the ground of performance. The issue 
is one of denial of suretyship. The laws of King !NE provided,{9 
"A man may make denial of suretyship if he know that he does 
right." The surety could clear himself by an oath. As the original 
"Alfred I, I ; Edgar, Intro. 6; Edgar II., 6. 
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transaction was entered into by public ceremony, the hesitation to 
take a false oath would be great. If the surety did not clear him-
self the .sureties that he had given would constrain payment. As 
mentioned before, in Gr,ANVIL'S age the surety could •be sued.~0 
It is submitted that at least in the later Anglo-Saxon law the 
S1;lrety could himself be sued, and that if he refused to give sureties 
he could be fined, or upon continued contumacy, further punished. 
(c) The Surety's Right to Reimbursement. 
The sureties were representatives of the debtor's family. But in 
addition to the general powers of internal discipline which the group 
exercised over its members, which in the lo_osely organized and dem-
ocratic kindred may not have been of great effectiveness, the debtor 
had placed himself, by his wed, under the special protection and into 
the power of his sureties to answer a particular claim. They could 
rightfully exercise all the necessary physical compulsion over their 
prisoner· just as •bail can today. In addition to that there were 
strong moral and social sanctions, family feeling, gratitude for pro-
tection, the injustice of allowing the burden to fall upon the sureties, 
public opinion, and perhaps the physical help, if nect:ssary, of other 
members of the kindred. 
It was die sureties' right as well as their duty to compel the debtor 
to appear in court and defend. Likewise it was their business to 
force him to satisfy the judgment, if he had the wherewithall. If 
he did not and the sureties paid, the sureties' power to constrain the 
debtor remained and could •be exercised t9 compel reimbursement. 
Ordinarily the pressure which could be brought. to bear must 
have been amply sufficient. But if it was not the king offered help. 
A recalcitrant debtor could ·be confined in a royal prison, and he was 
there required to suffer whatever the bishop might prescribe. If 
the debtor resisted and had to be forced, he forfeited his weapons 
and his property. If he escaped he was declared an outlaw, and 
was to be excommunicate in all Christian churches. u 
The matter was thu~ one of internal family di~cipline primarily, 
but was sa~ctioned by custom and law, and by the.help of the state 
if required. It was not unlike the right of a father to discipline or 
chastise a son. It would seem improbable that legal issues were 
at an early day framed ;between surety and debtor. If a dispute 
arose between them it would be a matter to be settled by the family 
council. 
" Glanvil, Book X, c. 3. 
n Alfred, I. 
ANGLO-SAXON CONTRACTS 
But as kindreds broke up and family ties became weaker-which 
was already a noticeable phenomenon in the second period here 
<:onsidered-what took the place of them? Society, as h·as been 
noticed, was then organized into tithings and hundreds. Every ten 
men were bound together, and the head man of the group with the 
assistance of the members was supposed to maintain discipline and 
to settle such disputes as he could. The members of the group were 
constituted sureties for each other, so if one man paid another's 
debt, his reimbursement was a group concern. Merchants were 
organized- into gilds and were sureties for each other; and reim-
bursement would then be a gild affair. 
We have then a thoroughly well recognized right. It may not 
have been until late that it gave rise to a right of suit in the courts, 
though in one sense the family council, the tithing, and the gild 
were themselves not unlike courts. The only substantial difference 
was that a dispute between surety and debtor was a matter to be 
settled within the group and was perhaps informally handled, while · 
<:ontroversies between groups had to be determined in court at the 
pieeting of the larger unit, the hundred. Where shall we say the 
law begins? Shall we confine it to matters external to the group? 
If so, it was perhaps a long time before the surety's right to re-
imbursement became actionable. It was actionable in GI.ANvu.'s 
day.52 How long before then it seems difficult to say. 
(To be Continued.) 
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